This is a picture of ESMT books and working papers

Publications

ESMT Berlin publishes in international academic journals, which are first-class in their respective fields. Research also provides cutting-edge and profound insights for the business community as well as the classroom through managerial publications and case studies. This rare integration of research and practice makes ESMT Berlin an outstanding location for generating relevant and ground-breaking knowledge.

Journal Article

Mangelnde Relevanz als Informationsqualitätsproblem in unternehmerischen Entscheidungsprozessen

Lecture Notes in Informatics 50: 249–253
Mario Rese, Gernot Gräfe, Valerie Herter (2004)
Abstract:
Subject(s): Strategy and general management
Volume 50
Pages 249–253

Journal Article

The sustainability of exploitation positions: A theoretical analysis based on transaction cost economics, Austrian economics and the resource based view

Advances in Applied Business Strategy 8: 253–279
Mario Rese, Birgit Engel (2004)
Abstract:
Subject(s): Strategy and general management
Keyword(s): transaction cost economics, the resource-based view, market process theory

The aim of both marketing theorists and resource-based view proponents is to explain the creation and the sustainability of competitive advantages (Srivastava et al., 2001, p. 777). What has not been considered so far is the role of exploitation positions within the competitive game. The purpose of this article is to investigate the consequences of a strategy concerning the active creation of exploitation positions on the side of the customers. The reason for this is the observed tendency in several industries - elevators, paper machines, gas turbines - to actively create such positions. The underlying assumption is that this strategy leads to a competitive advantage for the initial transaction as well as to higher profits for the supplier taking into account the entire relationship. Mainly the second advantage of a higher profit depends heavily on the sustainability of an exploitation position. Therefore, this paper identifies the drivers controlling the sustainability of an exploitation position. In order to derive a broad understanding three different theoretical approaches - Transaction Cost Economics, the Resource-Based View, and Market Process Theory (Austrian Economics) - will be used to explain the effects of exploitation on the competitive position and the profit of the supplier. Finally, the outcome of this paper is threefold: First, the competitive consequences of an exploitation strategy will be identified. Second, the impact of each theoretical approach on the question of exploitation will be analyzed. Third, the integrative potential of the three different theoretical approaches will be examined. More precisely, we discuss institutional economics and information asymmetry in a truly dynamic setting and the impact of radical ignorance and alertness on the idea of isolating mechanisms. This will be done in a parallel discussion of the problems in general and along one case study which focuses on the elevator market.

With permission of Emerald

Volume 8
Pages 253–279

Journal Article

Information supply on the internet: An analysis of supplier behaviour and consequences for customer decision making

International Journal of Management and Decision Making 4 (2–3): 161–177
Mario Rese, Gernot Gräfe (2003)
Abstract:
Subject(s): Marketing
Keyword(s): information medium, internet, market transparency, information quality, supplier behaviour, economics of information, game theory
Volume 4
Issue 2–3
Pages 161–177

Journal Article

Relationship Marketing and Customer Satisfaction: An Information Economics Perspective

Marketing Theory 3 (1): 97–117
Mario Rese (2003)
Abstract:
Subject(s): Marketing
Keyword(s): customer retention, customer satisfaction, economics of information theory
Volume 3
Issue 1
Pages 97–117

Journal Article

Erhöhte Markttransparenz durch das Internet? Eine informationsökonomische Analyse des Anbieterverhaltens bei der Bereitstellung von Informationen

Die Unternehmung 56 (5): 333–354
Mario Rese, Gernot Gräfe (2002)
Abstract:
Subject(s): Marketing
Keyword(s): Informationsökonomik, Informationsmedium Internet, Markttransparenz, Beschaffungsinformationen, Informationsqualität, Anbieterverhalten, Spieltheorie
Volume 56
Issue 5
Pages 333–354

Journal Article

CRM - Dichtung und Wahrheit auf Business-to-Business-Märkten

Thexis 19 (1): 19–22
Mario Rese (2002)
Abstract:
Subject(s): Marketing
Volume 19
Issue 1
Pages 19–22

Journal Article

Erhöhte Informationstransparenz durch das Internet - Ein Märchen der Neuzeit? Oder: Suchen und finden Königssöhne ihr Aschenputtel heutzutage im Internet?

Forschungsforum Paderborn 5: 26–30
Mario Rese, Gernot Gräfe (2002)
Abstract:
Subject(s): Marketing
Volume 5
Pages 26–30

Journal Article

Inferior products and profitable deception

Review of Economic Studies 84 (1): 323–356
Paul Heidhues, Botond Kőszegi, Takeshi Murooka
Abstract:
Subject(s): Economics, politics and business environment
JEL Code(s): D14, D18, D21

We analyze conditions facilitating profitable deception in a simple model of a competitive retail market. Firms selling homogenous products set anticipated prices that consumers understand and additional prices that naive consumers ignore unless revealed to them by a firm, where we assume that there is a binding floor on the anticipated prices. Our main results establish that “bad" products (those with lower social surplus than an alternative) tend to be more reliably profitable than “good" products. Specifically, (1) in a market with a single socially valuable product and sufficiently many firms, a deceptive equilibrium - in which firms hide additional prices - does not exist and firms make zero profits. But perversely, (2) if the product is socially wasteful, then a profitable deceptive equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, (3) in a market with multiple products, since a superior product both diverts sophisticated consumers and renders an inferior product socially wasteful in comparison, it guarantees that firms can profitably sell the inferior product by deceiving consumers. We apply our framework to the mutual-fund and credit-card markets, arguing that it explains a number of empirical findings regarding these industries.

This is an open access article.

Volume 84
Issue 1
Pages 323–356

Journal Article

Naivete-based discrimination

The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132 (2): 1019–1054
Paul Heidhues, Botond Kőszegi
Abstract:
Subject(s): Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s): Sophistication, naivete, first-degree, price, discrimination, third-degree price discrimination, big data, privacy
JEL Code(s): D21, D49, D69, L19

We initiate the study of naivete-based discrimination, the practice of conditioning offers on external information about consumers’ naivete. Knowing that a consumer is naive increases a monopolistic or competitive firm's willingness to generate inefficiency to exploit the consumer's mistakes, so naivete-based discrimination is not Pareto-improving, can be Pareto-damaging, and often lowers total welfare when classical preference-based discrimination does not. Moreover, the effect on total welfare depends on a hitherto unemphasized market feature: the extent to which the exploitation of naive consumers distorts trade with different types of consumers. If the distortion is homogenous across naive and sophisticated consumers, then under an arguably weak and empirically testable condition, naivete-based discrimination lowers total welfare. In contrast, if the distortion arises only for trades with sophisticated consumers, then perfect naivete-based discrimination maximizes social welfare, although imperfect discrimination often lowers welfare. And if the distortion arises only for trades with naive consumers, then naivete-based discrimination has no effect on welfare. We identify applications for each of these cases. In our primary example, a credit market with present-biased borrowers, firms lend more than socially optimal to increase the amount of interest naive borrowers unexpectedly pay, creating a homogenous distortion. The condition for naivete-based discrimination to lower welfare is then weaker than prudence.

This is an open access article.

Volume 132
Issue 2
Pages 1019–1054

Pages